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On the Economics of  Product 
Differentiation  in Auditing* 
Dan A. Simunic 
Michael Stein 
University of  British Columbia 
I. Introduction 
Corporate financial  statement audits have traditionally been viewed as 
homogeneous across auditors. For example, the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities ("Cohen Commission") in its Report [1978, p. 111] stated 
that: 
When a product or service offered  by different  suppliers differs 
significantly  to the user, or appears to differ  significantly,  it is easier for 
one of  its producers to maintain a higher, noncompetitive price. Public 
accounting firms  go to considerable length to develop superior services 
for  their clients, but there is little  effective  product  differentiation  from  the 
viewpoint of  the present buyer of  the service (emphasis added), that is, 
management of  the corporation. 
In support of  this view, it is usual to assert that the identity of  the firm  which 
performs  an audit is irrelevant since every examination must conform  to 
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and all firm  partners must be 
fully  professionally  qualified.  Thus users of  financial  statements have no reason 
(nor basis) to distinguish among auditing firms. 
At the same time, however, it has also been recognized that a company 
which may have a perfectly  satisfactory  relationship with a local accounting firm 
will often  change auditors to a well-known national firm  when that company first 
sells securities to the public. It is usually alleged that such "displacement" 
occurs as a result of  pressure from  underwriters (see, for  example, Wall  Street 
Journal,  July 18, 1983, "Small CPA Concern Sues an Underwriter Over Loss 
of  Client") or because of  other unwarranted "biases." For example, Arnett 
and Danos [1979] use the term "perceptual barriers to viability" to describe 
these "biases." Under the assumption that the services of  auditing firms  are 
homogeneous, it follows  that professional  accounting 
*The research study, upon which this paper is based, was funded  by a grant from  the Canadian 
Certified  General Accountants' Research Foundation (Vancouver, B.C.), whose support we 
gratefully  acknowledge. Also, we have benefited  from  the comments of  participants in the 
accounting workshops at the University of  Alberta, University of  British Columbia, Ohio State 
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bodies, such as the AICPA or CICA, should strive to eliminate "biases," 
perhaps by "educating" managers, underwriters, and other financial  statement 
users. However, if  we drop the homogeneity assumption, then auditor 
displacement at the time of  an initial public offering  of  securities (to the extent 
such displacement actually occurs) may simply be evidence of  rational economic 
behavior. 
1.1 The  Product  Differentiation  Hypothesis 
Recently, several researchers [Simunic, 1980; De Angelo, 1981(a) and 
1981(b); Dopuch and Simunic, 1980 and 1982] have suggested that audit 
services, like most products, are likely to be differentiated. 
De Angelo [1981(a)] argues for  the existence of  audit quality differentiation, 
in the sense of  systematic differences  in auditor independence, essentially as 
follows.  First, she assumes that the production of  audit services for  a specific 
client over time is subject to a learning curve. Given this condition, if, 
whenever a client changes auditors, there is competitive bidding among 
potential suppliers, then the first  year's audit fee  will be less than the avoidable 
cost in that year. This is referred  to as "low balling." In other words, the 
auditor is "forced"  (through the competitive bidding process) to invest in the 
client by passing through into his initial fee  bid the discounted future  cost 
savings due to learning. The investment will be recovered (along with at least a 
normal return) through fees  in subsequent years which exceed avoidable costs, 
and these "excess fees"  constitute client-specific  quasi-rents. 
With respect to auditor independence, the important feature  of  this 
argument is that the quasi-rents can be lost (and the auditor earn less than a 
normal return) should a client unexpectedly  change auditors. Thus, other things 
being equal, the existence of  client-specific  quasi-rents gives a client more 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the incumbent auditor, potentially impairing that 
auditor's independence. However, De Angelo argues, other things are not 
equal in that an incumbent auditor who is tempted to "cheat'' in order to please 
one client must also consider the possible loss of  his other clients, should his 
malfeasance  subsequently be discovered. Hence a large audit firm  with many 
audits and earning large aggregate client-specific  quasi-rents faces  a higher 
potential opportunity loss from  "cheating'' to retain a client than would a small 
audit firm  with few  clients. The aggregate quasi-rents are said to constitute a 
"collateral bond" against auditor "cheating." As a result, auditor independ-
ence will be positively correlated with audit firm  size. 
Note that De Angelo's argument is essentially mechanistic, being driven by 
an assumed audit learning curve and competition in the bidding process. Many 
objections can be raised against the reasonableness of  this scenario, including 
the fact  that the existence of  a significant  learning curve in auditing has not been 
empirically demonstrated.1 In addition, De Angelo ignores the demand  for 
differentiated  audit services, except in the narrow sense that a client is not 
willing to pay the cost of  an independent audit to an auditor who, in fact,  is not 
perceived as supplying such audits (i.e., a "cheater"). 
In a second paper, De Angelo [1981(b)] broadens her notion of  audit quality 
into "the market assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) 
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discover a breach in the client's accounting system and (b) report the breach" 
[p. 186]. Differences  in quality supplied are still motivated by differences  in 
auditor collateral bonds; that is, audit quality is correlated with audit firm  size. 
In addition, De Angelo conjectures that the demand for  differences  in audit 
quality arises from  differences  in agency costs across clients. Several of  the 
linkages (particularly the connection between the size of  the collateral bond and 
the probability of  discovering  a breach) in that paper are very vague. However, 
some of  the arguments (discussed later) are consistent with the present work. 
At about the same time, Dopuch and Simunic [1980; 1982] proposed a 
demand based model of  product differentiation  wherein audit services pos-
sessed two characteristics valued by a company's top management: a contribu-
tion to organization control and credibility with external financial  statement 
users. They argue that credibility is simply associated with an auditor's 
reputation or brand name. The demand for  credibility is assumed to arise when 
there is an asymmetry of  information  between top management and investors 
about the honesty of  top management. In this situation, a costly audit by a 
credible auditor can either signal management's honesty to investors or reduce 
agency costs by restricting top management's ability to conceal, through 
misrepresentation in the financial  statements, the consequence of  actions taken 
which were in the best interests of  top management ("self-serving  behavior") 
but not shareholders. Dopuch and Simunic argue further  that top manage-
ments' utility functions  and opportunity sets for  "self-serving  behavior" likely 
vary across companies. Hence, "the market is not likely to be characterized by 
a single value of  credibility demanded and supplied" [1982, p. 413]. Note that 
an important element of  any market characterized by information  asymmetry is 
the question of  observability. Thus, Dopuch and Simunic argue further  that 
auditor credibility must be associated with an observable characteristic, such as 
the name of  the auditor, rather than the undisclosed details of  the audit 
examination. 
These arguments are silent as to the specific  rank ordering(s) of  auditors on 
a credibility dimension and the theory is sufficiently  general to allow different 
orderings of  audit firms  in different  circumstances. For example, auditors may 
possess different  local, regional, or client industry-specific  reputations. How-
ever, from  the observed dominance of  the Big Eight firms  in the market for 
audits of  publicly held companies, Dopuch and Simunic infer  that audits of  such 
companies by Big Eight firms  are more credible than audits by smaller firms. 
1.2 Previous  Tests  for  Product  Differentiation 
Several researchers have attempted to empirically test this "product 
differentiation  hypothesis," generally in the simplified  two-class form  wherein 
audits by Big Eight firms  are hypothesized to be of  higher quality than audits by 
non-Big Eight firms. 
Nichols and Smith [1983] examined the stock market reaction to auditor 
changes between auditor classes during the years 1973-79 by 51 companies 
whose common shares were listed on either the New York or American Stock 
Exchanges. In a series of  tests, they found  that while abnormal returns were in 
the directions predicted by the product differentiation  hypothesis (i.e., negative 
residuals were associated with Big Eight to non-Big Eight changes while 
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positive residuals were associated with non-Big Eight to Big Eight changes), 
the mean differences  were not statistically significant.  They concluded that the 
magnitude of  any market revaluation of  the firm  arising from  a change in auditor 
class may not be detectable using conventional methods, particularly for  large, 
listed companies. 
Shockley and Holt [1983] used multidimensional scaling to examine how a 
sample of  bank chief  financial  officers  rated the Big Eight CPA firms.  The basic 
issue tested was whether or not purchasers of  audit services could systemat-
ically differentiate  among the Big Eight firms  (i.e., whether there was product 
differentiation  within the Big Eight). Shockley and Holt found  that bankers 
tended to differentiate  among these audit firms  largely on the basis of  market 
shares within the banking industry. They therefore  suggested that industry 
expertise may be a source of  audit quality differentiation. 
Healy and Lys [1983] used the product differentiation  hypothesis to explain 
the acquisition by Big Eight firms  of  smaller audit firms.  They conjectured that 
auditor mergers may be the least costly method for  the clients of  the acquired 
firm  to change the quality of  their auditing. However, not all clients of  the 
acquired firm  are likely to demand a change in audit quality at the time of  the 
merger. Hence, any systematic differences  between those clients which stay 
with the acquiring Big Eight firm  and those which revert to a smaller auditor 
would represent factors  associated with the demand for  audit quality. Their test 
consisted of  an examination of  switching vs. non-switching clients of  J.K. 
Lasser & Co., following  its merger into Touche Ross, and the clients of  S.D. 
Leidesdorf  & Co., following  that firm's  acquisition by Ernst & Whinney. The 
results were weakly consistent with the product differentiation  hypothesis in 
that switching vs. non-switching clients differed  on certain plausible dimen-
sions, including size and leverage. However, other plausible explanatory 
variables, including changes in client capital structure, were found  to be 
insignificantly  different  between the two groups. 
Palmrose [1984] investigated the association between agency cost variables 
and the use of  different  classes of  auditors. She hypothesized that the higher 
the expected level of  agency costs arising from  a certain ownership-manage-
ment structure in a company, the higher the level of  audit quality which will be 
demanded. The test consisted of  a series of  logistic regressions of  auditor 
choice (Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight) on a set of  potential explanatory variables 
which measured expected agency costs (i.e., client size, degree of  separation 
between ownership and management, leverage, and the existence of  manage-
ment compensation plans tied to accounting numbers). The sample consisted of 
a cross-section of  276 companies classified  by industry. The results were 
inconclusive and somewhat anomalous in that client size was the only consist-
ently significant  explanatory variable (i.e., the clients of  the Big Eight firms 
tended to be larger). In addition, leverage was the only other variable which 
was sometimes significant,  but in the wrong direction. That is, the clients of 
Big Eight firms  tended to have lower leverage (lower expected agency costs), 
which was contrary to the hypothesis. 
One direct implication of  product differentiation  in auditing is that there 
should be related systematic differences  in audit prices. As pointed out by 
Simunic [1980], the market for  audits is a hedonic market wherein differenti-
ated products are not observable directly, but rather are revealed by differ-
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ences in prices associated with differences  in observed product characteristics. 
Thus, if  Big Eight firms  deliver a higher quality of  service than non-Big Eight 
firms  then, other things held constant, audit prices should likewise vary 
between the two groups. 
The existing evidence on this point is mixed. Simunic [1980] found  that 
prices charged by the Big Eight firms  in the United States were, on average, 
not significantly  different  and perhaps somewhat lower than non-Big Eight firm 
prices, across all sizes of  clients. Note that his sample consisted of  a cross 
section of  397 audits of  companies ranging in size from  $500,000 in assets (and 
sales) to about $10 billion in assets (and sales). Using a pooled cross section of 
136 Australian companies, Francis [1984], on the other hand, found  that prices 
charged by Big Eight firms  were significantly  higher than prices charged by non-
Big Eight firms.  This is consistent with the results reported by Taffler  and 
Ramalinggam [1982] using data from  the United Kingdom. However, in addition 
to the institutional differences  between countries, the companies in Francis' 
sample were significantly  smaller (by about a factor  of  10) than those in 
Simunic's U.S. sample. In a subsequent paper, Francis and Stokes [1985] 
report that the positive difference  between Big Eight and non-Big Eight firm 
prices seems to be largely confined  to the very smallest companies in their 
sample (mean assets of  $1.8 million Australian dollars). This leads the authors 
to speculate that scale economies to Big Eight firms  and consequent lower 
production costs may "swamp" the price effects  of  product differentiation, 
.except for  audits of  very small companies where "scale economies are less 
likely to exist" [p. 12]. 
The conflicting  nature of  this evidence may, at least partially, be due to the 
difficulties  of  inferring  audit prices from  audit fee  data. An audit fee,  which alone 
is directly observable, can be thought of  as the product of  price times audit 
quantity purchased by the client company. Hence in a cross section (and time 
series) of  fees,  sources of  extraneous differences  in audit quantities must be 
carefully  controlled before  inferences  about prices can be made. While there is 
now considerable evidence about the major determinants of  audit fees  [e.g., 
Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1983; Maher, Broman, Colson and Tiessen, 1985], 
the specifications  of  existing models are no doubt imperfect  and omitted 
variables may bias regression coefficients.  In addition, many audit fee  deter-
minants are correlated with company size, the relation between fees  and size is 
nonlinear, and, because of  the dominance of  the Big Eight firms  in the audits of 
large companies, it is very difficult  to obtain a sample of  audits wherein the 
clients of  Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms  are well matched on a size 
dimension. Hence, a failure  to properly control the nonlinear client size effect 
on fees  can easily lead to a biased coefficient  on an auditor identity variable. 
Add to these econometric difficulties  the possible confounding  effects  of  scale 
economies to large auditors, and it is not surprising that no clear evidence on 
product differentiation  has yet emerged using audit fee  data. 
In summary, the empirical tests of  the product differentiation  hypothesis 
have, to date, been suggestive but inconclusive. But, this is not surprising 
given the early stage of  the research on this topic, as well as the economics of 
auditing in general. 
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1.3 Plan  of  this  Paper 
The economic foundations  for  the product differentiation  hypothesis in 
auditing are only roughly and incompletely sketched out in the existing 
literature. Our objective in this paper is to develop these foundations,  which 
serve as a basis for  a theory of  auditor choice by top management of  a company. 
Note that the auditor choice decision is non-trivial only under the hypothesis 
that auditor services are somehow differentiated.  The assumption of  homoge-
neous audit services implies that the assignment of  auditors to clients is random 
or simply a function  of  auditor cost conditions. For example, if  only the largest 
auditing firms  are fully  able to exploit available economies of  scale due to input 
indivisibilities, then there is no meaningful  auditor choice and these largest 
firms  will eventually (in a world of  transaction costs) "sweep" the market for 
audits. 
In Section II, using Lancaster's [1966] "characteristics" framework,  we 
begin by analyzing the attributes of  the audit service which may be valued by 
top management. In doing so, we consider the distinction between audit quality 
and quantity and their relation to audit service inputs. We then analyze the 
"product location" decision of  auditors, and develop the argument that the 
credibility of  an audit is communicated to external financial  statement users 
(e.g., prospective shareholders and creditors) through an audit firm's  brand 
name. Thus it is the brand name which has ex ante value to top management 
when seeking to influence  the decisions of  users. We conclude this section with 
a discussion of  some welfare  implications of  product differentiation. 
In Section III, we associate auditor credibility with the power of  an auditor's 
tests (in a statistical sense), and analyze the sources of  demand for  different 
levels of  credibility. We argue that an auditor's brand name induces a Bayesian 
revision of  users' prior probability distributions that financial  statements 
contain material error. In a world of  rational users who can "price protect" 
themselves when transacting with management, cross sectional differences  in 
the prior probability of  error and the wealth effects  of  error will cause top 
managers of  different  companies to demand different  credibility levels. We 
examine the role of  future  rents and quasi-rents in "enforcing"  the delivery of 
a particular expected power of  test, and consider the implication of  our analysis 
for  rates of  litigation ("hit rates") which can be expected to occur across audit 
firms  whose credibility varies. Finally, we compare our analysis to that of  De 
Angelo and present some examples to illustrate the main ideas. The paper 
closes with some concluding observations and comments. 
II. Economics of  Product Differentiation 
2.1 Basic Concepts 
Consistent with the traditional view of  financial  statement audits, the 
standard assumption in microeconomic analysis has been that the products 
produced by firms  in a particular industry or market are homogeneous. That is, 
within an industry, consumers cannot distinguish the product produced by firm  i 
from  that produced by firm  j. More formally,  this assumption is expressed by 
the condition that the cross price elasticity of  demand for  the product of  the i th 
firm  in an industry with respect to the price of  product of  the j th firm  in the 
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industry is infinite,  or the products are perfect  substitutes.2 An implication of 
this assumption is that a single price must prevail within the market. 
Chamberlain [1933] was the first  economist to suggest that no two firms 
are likely to make precisely the same product, even though they operate in the 
same industry. He coined the term "monopolistic competition" to describe a 
market where there are many sellers, each one producing a somewhat 
differentiated  product. If,  on the other hand, there are only a few  firms  in the 
industry, the market can be described as a differentiated  products oligopoly. 
Note that differentiated  products are assumed to be strong  substitutes, but not 
perfect  substitutes for  each other. That is, their cross price elasticities are finite 
and relatively large. If  the products are very weak substitutes in demand (cross 
price elasticities approach zero), then the products are no longer simply 
differentiated,  but the firms  can be thought of  as operating in different 
industries. In fact,  a criticism of  Chamberlain's work has been that the notion of 
differentiated  products is really nothing new, but simply causes us to think 
more deeply about which group of  firms  ought to be considered an industry 
[e.g., Stigler, 1968]! 
Following Chamberlain, and the essentially concurrent work by Hotelling 
[1929] on spacial duopoly, there were few  contributions to the economics of 
product differentiation  until the work of  Lancaster [1966; 1971] on the nature of 
product characteristics. In considering exactly how products may be differenti-
ated, Lancaster proposed the notion that a commodity is not desired in and of 
itself,  but rather for  the bundle of  utility bearing characteristics it contains. For 
example, a specific  brand and model of  automobile provides not only the 
obvious characteristic transportation,  but also some amount of  the characteris-
tics safety,  social prestige,  driving  entertainment,  pleasant appearance, etc. Each 
of  these characteristics commands an implicit price in a market, and the 
observed market price of  the commodity (e.g., automobile) will be a linear 
combination of  the measured quantities of  each of  the component characteris-
tics. Since quantities of  characteristics vary across products, observed prices 
will also vary. Hence in order to compare product prices, construct price 
indices over time, or test hypotheses about market behavior using price data, it 
is necessary to control for  differences  in product characteristics. A way to do 
this is to estimate the coefficients  of  a hedonic regression function  where 
product price is the dependent variable and quantities of  characteristics are the 
independent variables. This is essentially the theoretical rationale underlying 
the studies of  audit fees  discussed in Section 1.3 
The notion of  characteristics suggests that there are two basic ways in 
which products can be differentiated.  In the simplest case, the industry's 
product contains only one characteristic, but products of  various firms  differ  in 
the amount of  the characteristic each contains. This situation can be described 
as vertical product differentiation  and it implies that products can be ordered on 
a single dimension, which can be labeled product  quality.  The more general 
case, where the product possesses many characteristics and producers differ  in 
the amount of  each characteristic their product contains, can be called 
horizontal product differentiation.  Note that in this case, the description of  each 
firm's  product is a k component vector of  quantities (where k is the number of 
characteristics or dimensions) and, in general, the products of  various suppliers 
cannot be ordered. 
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2.2 Demand for  Audit  Service  Characteristics 
Before  proceeding further,  it is useful  to relate these concepts to the audit 
services market. First, it is important to recognize that audit services are not a 
consumption good, but rather a factor  of  production. That is, neither audit 
services nor their component characteristics are direct objects of  utility to any 
ultimate consumer, and the demand for  audit services is not the outcome of  a 
standard constrained utility maximization problem. Thus, the demand for 
differentiated  audit services cannot arise from  a simple assumption that 
consumers vary in their tastes, preferences,  and incomes. 
As a factor  of  production or intermediate good, the demand for  audit 
services is derived from  the objective function  of  the top management of  the 
audited company. We assume that this objective is to maximize own expected 
utility.4 Some insight into the characteristics of  the audit service which may be 
valued by (or increase the wealth of)  top management can be derived by 
considering various possible relationships between top management, share-
holders, and creditors. 
Top  managers are also owners and  there are no creditors 
These assumptions describe a smaller closely-held company with no debt. 
Will audit services be demanded at all in this situation? The answer would seem 
to depend crucially on the size and complexity of  the company and the resulting 
degree to which top managers can personally monitor the various activities of 
their subordinates. The less their personal control over the organization, the 
more likely an outside audit would be valuable to top management. The audit 
service would be part of  the control system over the information  produced 
within the organization, and hence the company's financial  statements. This 
demand, which arises from  the internal agency problems of  an organization, 
may be termed a control  demand. Therefore,  a plausible audit service 
characteristic along which auditors can be differentiated  is the contribution of 
the audit to the organization's internal control system. 
Top  managers are separate from  owners and  there are no creditors 
These assumptions describe a publicly held company with an all-equity 
capital structure (ignoring government regulations and any mandatory audit 
requirement). There is now an agency relationship between top management 
and outside shareholders.5 Given the existence of  this agency relationship, 
there is likely to be a demand for  an independent attestation (audit) as to the 
truthfulness  of  the information  reported by top management to the outside 
shareholders, and, in general, both parties (groups) might benefit  from  such an 
audit [Beaver, 1981]. The key attribute of  the audit service is likely to be its 
credibility  as perceived by the shareholders. Hence, this is a second character-
istic or dimension along which audit services can be differentiated. 
Effects  of  the introduction  of  debt  into the capital  structure 
The issuance of  debt by a closely held company creates an agency 
relationship between the debtholder(s) as principal and an owner-manager as 
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agent. After  the issuance of  debt, the owner-manager is motivated to take 
actions which increase the value of  the equity, but decrease the value of  the 
debt. A major potential source of  such agency costs is adoption of  an 
investment policy in which projects with a high variance but low expected net 
present value are substituted for  lower variance but higher net present value 
projects [Jensen and Meckling, 1976].6 Note that the owner-manager will 
exclusively earn the possible high returns from  high variance projects, but 
shares the risk of  possible low returns or losses with the debtholders. This 
agency relationship is likely to give rise to the use of  restrictive covenants in 
debt agreements [see Smith and Warner, 1979] as well as a demand for 
independent attestation to verify  both the compliance with these agreements 
and the truthfulness  of  general financial  information  reported by the owner-
manager to the debtholders. As with public shareholders, credibility  or 
reputation is thus likely to be an important audit service attribute. Of  course, 
both the manager-shareholder and manager-debtholder agency relationships 
will exist simultaneously if  debt is issued by a publicly held company, reinforcing 
the demand for  audit service credibility. 
In summary, two major audit service characteristics arise from  a considera-
tion of  the possible organization structure of  the audited company: 
1) the contribution of  the audit to organization control,  and 
2) the credibility  of  the audit as perceived by shareholders and creditors. 
The importance of  these two characteristics was confirmed  in a recent study of 
881 small, closely held U.S. companies by O'Keefe  and Barefield  [1985]. Of  the 
companies who voluntarily  purchased audits in this sample (132 companies or 
15 percent), 57 percent listed "enhances credibility (of  financial  statements) 
with outside users" as the most important reason for  the purchase, while 46 
percent listed "augments internal control" as the second most important 
reason.7 Moreover, other reasons for  the purchase were mentioned only 
infrequently  (e.g., 12/17 percent listed "limits liability" as a primary/second-
ary reason). 
A third possible characteristic which top management may value is the 
scope of  the product  line offered  by an audit firm,  in particular the availability of 
various management consulting type services from  the audit supplier. Such 
product availability reduces management's search costs when seeking to 
acquire consulting services. In addition, it is often  claimed that production of 
auditing creates a knowledge externality or spillover which reduces the costs of 
consulting services when the services are produced jointly. This issue was 
analyzed and tested by Simunic [1984] who found  that the pricing of  audit 
services is consistent with the hypothesis that knowledge spills over from 
auditing to consulting. Thus, managers in certain circumstances may be better 
off  by purchasing the audit service from  a supplier with a wide product line. 
However, this need not be true in all situations. For example, in the data set on 
publicly held companies underlying Simunic [1980; 1984], 235 of  381 companies 
or 62 percent purchased no consulting service from  their auditor over a three-
year period.8 Further, of  the 277 companies audited by a Big Eight firm,  163 or 
59 percent purchased no consulting service from  their audit firm  during the 
period. Hence, the value of  wide service scope to managers can be assumed to 
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vary, creating a third characteristic along which audit firms  can be differenti-
ated. 
2.3 Distinctions  Between Characteristic  Quantities,  Quality  of 
Service,  and the Quantity  of  Inputs  and Output 
Based on this analysis, a description of  the audit service purchased by a 
particular client9 from  a particular audit firm  requires, in principle, the 
specification  of  a vector of  quantities of  three service characteristics: 
{control, credibility, product line} or {c1; c2, c3}. 
A unit of  each characteristic is assumed to be costly to produce. For example, 
the offering  of  a line of  consulting services which may or may not be demanded 
by a particular client is costly to the audit firm.  Or the development of  a certain 
credibility10 level with outside shareholders and creditors is also costly. 
Therefore,  each service characteristic commands a positive implicit price—say 
λ1, λ2 and λ3 — in the market. 
With differentiated  audit services, quality  of  service comparisons can be 
made using any dimension of  interest if  the quantities of  the suppressed 
characteristics are at least equal. For example, an audit service described by 
the vector {2, 8, 5} is of  higher quality than the service {2, 5, 5}, of  lower 
quality than the service {2, 9, 5} and not comparable in quality to the service 
{1, 10, 5}. 
In addition to the quantities of  service characteristics from  which quality of 
service rankings can sometimes be made, auditing also has a pure quantity 
dimension. This is so because audit service contexts differ  radically across 
companies. We have argued that some differences  in client contexts are the 
basis for  a demand for  differentiated  audit services. However, other contextual 
differences  lead to supplier choice and the delivery of  a certain quantity of 
service on the basis of  supplier efficiency  considerations in a context  taken 
alone. To make this distinction meaningful,  it is necessary to clearly specify  a 
base level or standard service. All client context differences  which affect  the 
resources expended by a supplier in providing the base level service are 
sources of  pure audit quantity differences.  Conversely, any context differences 
which lead to different  choices of  service vectors, {c1, c2, c3}, are sources of 
product differentiation  among auditors. 
The base level service is defined  by the simple purchase of  an audit 
opinion.11 If  management only values an audit opinion per se (perhaps because 
an audit is mandated by law), then management would simply choose the least-
cost producer in the circumstances. This characterization of  the problem is the 
basis for  the traditional view that all auditors deliver the same homogeneous 
product—an appropriate audit opinion. Empirically, it motivates a search for 
auditor scale economies [e.g., Danos and Eichenseher, 1982]. The hypothesis 
of  product differentiation  motivates a search beyond  the opinion to distinguish-
ing service characteristics. Of  course, management still demands an efficient 
producer of  a particular characteristic vector, but auditor choice is no longer a 
cost minimization problem. Rather, it requires explicit recognition of  a benefit 
function  to top management. 
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If  the pure quantity of  auditing is measured by q, then an audit service fee 
can be denoted as 
F = (λ1C1 + λ2c2 + λ3c3)q. 
While audit fee  data are not examined in this paper, some examples of  fee 
determination are useful  to illustrate the ideas. Suppose that a client wishes to 
purchase a base level service—an audit opinion. Management deems the audit 
valueless in controlling the organization and has no use for  consulting services. 
Since some auditor must sign the opinion, credibility or c2 can arbitrarily be 
assigned a minimum value of  1. Hence the characteristic vector demanded 
would be the base level {0,1,0} and the fee  would be 
F = λ2q 
where q depends on company size, complexity, etc. Consider now an identical 
company, except that management values the auditor's ability to perform 
certain consulting services as needed. Say the desired characteristic vector is 
{0, 1, 1}. Note that this is a higher quality service. The service fee  would be 
F = (λ2 + λ3)q where F > F . 
The fee  now reflects  the presence of  both attributes and is scaled by q. Finally, 
suppose there exists another identical company in terms of  size, complexity, 
etc. whose top management chooses an audit service which improves organiza-
tion control, has a higher credibility with outsiders than the base level, and is 
obtained from  a supplier who is capable of  rendering certain consulting services 
as needed. Say the vector {2, 3,1} characterizes this service. The fee  for  this 
service, which is of  higher quality than in the previous case, would be 
F' = (2λ2 + 3λ3 + λ3)q where F' > F > F . 
What is the role of  service inputs in this fee  model?12 The outputs of  the 
audit service are the quantities {c1, c2, c3} and q. These outputs are related to 
inputs through a production function,  but the relationship need not be simple. 
For example, it seems likely that control and credibility are largely joint 
products, thus restricting the values c1 and c2 can assume. On the other hand, 
the breadth of  the available product line is not a function  of  variable audit 
service inputs but requires the incurrence of  a fixed  cost by the auditing firm. 
Higher levels of  available services presumably are associated with higher fixed 
costs. Thus, distinguishing between inputs and output is important in concep-
tualizing the audit service; but detail specification  of  the input/output rela-
tionship is not possible, nor usually necessary. 
2.4 Product  Location in Characteristics  Space 
If  audit services are differentiated,  then the question arises as to what 
service designs will be offered  for  sale in the market? Also, can a given audit 
firm  be expected to supply a single type of  service (i.e., a vector with specific 
characteristics {c1, c2, c3}) or simultaneously supply a variety of  characteristic 
vectors? These are important issues from  the point of  view of  both purchasers 
and producers. Audit firms  presumably want to design services so as to 
maximize economic rents; conversely, the services (and prices) which emerge 
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in market equilibrium affect  the welfare  of  purchasers. In the economics 
literature, these issues are described as "product location" decisions since the 
insights are frequently  derived by analogy from  formal  models of  spatial 
competition. 
Consider first  the question of  whether a producer will offer  a single or 
multiple characteristic vectors. For typical goods, it is common to observe a 
company which produces and markets a variety of  product types. For example, 
in a study of  product characteristics of  the U.K. fertilizer  industry, Shaw [1982] 
found  that 69 different  compound fertilizers  were available in 1978 from  three 
major producers. These products largely differed  only in composition with 
respect to the three plant nutrients—nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash. In this 
setting, labeling presumably allows the consumer to choose the most suitable 
product for  a particular situation, and the identity of  the selling firm  may well be 
irrelevant. 
As product characteristics become more subtle and thus more difficult  to 
enumerate and measure, a company will use separate brand names to identify 
products with specific  sets of  characteristics. For example, automobile manu-
facturers  sell a variety of  models which presumably differ  as to the amounts of 
the characteristics—transportation, safety,  prestige, etc.—each provides. In 
the limit, if  a company is (somehow) precluded from  developing a multiplicity of 
brands, the relevant brand will be the name of  the company itself.  In that 
situation, where the nature of  the product precludes direct communication of 
component characteristics and the firm  name is the brand, each supplier will 
produce a product with a single set of  characteristic quantities. 
Turning to the location decision, rent seeking suppliers can be expected to 
locate (i.e., choose a vector) in response to demand and the location choices of 
other suppliers. Unfortunately,  the economics literature offers  few  general 
results on equilibrium location choices, as solutions are very sensitive to 
alternative plausible assumptions about the behavior of  competitors, the nature 
of  the space in which competition occurs, and the distribution of  customers 
[Eaton and Lipsey, 1975]. However, some insights can be obtained by 
considering the basic factors  which affect  the location decision [see Waterson, 
1984]. 
Three cost elements enter into economic models of  location: 
a. a transportation cost per unit of  distance, 
b. production costs which can consist of  a fixed  and/or variable component, 
and 
c. relocation costs. 
The existence of  fixed  costs is crucial to the solution. If  there are no fixed  costs 
of  production, then firms  will simply produce at all points at which there are 
customers. That is, demand will be perfectly  satisfied  without the incurrence of 
transportation costs. The assumption of  fixed  costs implies that the number of 
suppliers must be limited to maintain profitability;  hence customers will vary in 
distance from  the nearest supplier. A second key assumption concerns the 
possibility of  relocation. That is, once a supplier chooses a location, are there 
costs of  relocation? In general, if  relocation is costless but there are fixed 
production costs, there is no unique equilibrium solution [Eaton and Lipsey, 
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1975]. Conversely, if  initial location choice is irreversible and suppliers enter a 
market sequentially, then the equilibrium location pattern will be symmetrical 
for  a uniform  distribution of  customers. For example, if  buyers are uniformly 
scattered along a line segment of  fixed  length, sellers will anticipate that 
unusually large "gaps" in the market will be filled  by competitors and hence 
will array themselves at equally spaced intervals [Waterson, 1984]. However, if 
customers are located in clusters, a closer packing of  suppliers will occur in 
areas of  high demand density with the "gaps" increasing in width in areas of 
low demand density [Shaw, 1982]. 
Let us now relate these ideas to the audit service. If  different  quantities of 
control, credibility, and product line scope can be readily observed and 
measured by top management (i.e., these attributes are like nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and potash!), it would seem that each audit firm  can produce a 
multiplicity of  characteristic vectors to meet (perhaps imperfectly  if  there are 
fixed  costs) client demand. However, even if  top management possesses such 
complete information,  the situation is complicated by the fact  that credibility  is 
purchased  solely  to influence  the decisions  of  shareholders  and  creditors.  These 
outside parties, who may be numerous and geographically scattered, are very 
unlikely to possess complete information.  We therefore  conclude that, for 
them, the audit firm's  brand name or reputation is the relevant measure of 
credibility. However, brand name will be less important for  the other two 
characteristics where the outputs (and inputs) can be more easily observed by 
top management, who directly value these characteristics. An implication is 
that each audit firm  will be identified  with a single level of  credibility at any 
moment in time, but may offer  a multiplicity of  control levels and, perhaps, 
product scope levels.13 In the next section, we analyze the auditor choice 
decision given this information  asymmetry and develop more precisely our 
notions of  credibility, brand name, and reputation. 
With respect to the product location decision of  auditors, the first  step is to 
identify  the analogues of  transportation, production, and relocation costs. Note 
that transportation costs are incurred whenever suppliers and customers are 
physically separated. Thus, in a characteristic space, an analogous cost arises 
if,  given the equilibrium distribution of  characteristic vectors of  suppliers, top 
management incurs an opportunity loss of  wealth or utility. For example, 
suppose managers rationally want to purchase an audit of  near zero credibility, 
but no such service is available on the market. Acquiring a credible audit 
implies an opportunity loss or transportation cost.14 Or suppose management 
wants an audit of  certain credibility from  a supplier who also specializes in a 
certain type of  consulting service, but no such supplier exists. Again, an 
opportunity loss is incurred. From the previous discussion, note that such 
opportunity losses will arise only if  there are fixed  costs of  producing at certain 
locations, that is, particular characteristic vectors. 
Since very little is known about the production functions  of  public account-
ing firms,  we can only speculate about the importance of  fixed  costs in 
producing a level of  control, credibility, and product scope. However, it seems 
likely that there are significant  fixed  costs associated with a firm's  capital 
commitments. The most important of  these will be the technology adopted and 
the human capital (expertise) of  professional  staff.  For example, Kinney [1985] 
has argued that auditing firms  can be categorized on an audit technology 
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dimension into "unstructured" vs. "structured" firms.  The first  group tends 
to minimize the constraints imposed on professional  judgment whereas the 
second uses statistical methods, decision aids, etc. to constrain and "improve" 
judgment. It seems plausible that fixed  costs increase as "structure" in-
creases. Fixed costs are also likely to increase as the professional  staff 
becomes more specialized (narrow). For example, the offering  of  a specialized 
consulting service to clients, such as industrial engineering for  plant design and 
cost control, no doubt adds to an audit firm's  fixed  costs. 
Two conclusions follow  from  this discussion. First, auditing firms  probably 
vary in the level of  fixed  costs they incur. Second, the higher the fixed  cost 
commitment, the less flexible  the firm  will be in producing a variety of 
characteristic vectors. This seems to be the basis for  the often  heard claim that 
small audit firms  are more flexible  in meeting a client's demands, although large 
firms  may be more efficient  in performing  specific,  complex tasks. With respect 
to the three audit service characteristics, fixed  costs can be important in all 
cases. As a result, all possible combinations of  control, credibility, and product 
scope are not likely to be available in the market. 
Finally, consider the costs incurred by an audit firm  when attempting to 
move from  one characteristic vector to another vector. Typically, relocation 
costs are those fixed  production costs which are "sunk" at a specific  location. 
These costs may be particularly high when information  about characteristics is 
conveyed by the brand name. Schmalensee [1978] points out that, for 
consumer goods, the "repositioning" of  brands can be so costly that it is 
frequently  cheaper to simply abandon an established brand whose sales have 
fallen  to low levels and introduce a new brand. Again, while there is no 
empirical evidence on the point, such costs are likely to exist in auditing. For 
example, if  an audit firm  invests in structured technologies which facilitate  the 
production of  high levels of  control and credibility but are unnecessary for 
producing low levels of  these characteristics, an attempted move from  the high 
level will be costly. Or, if  a firm  enters into an employment contract with a 
specialized consultant, firing  the consultant will be costly. Perhaps most 
important, as with consumer goods, it may be very costly for  a firm  to change 
the credibility level associated with its brand name. In fact,  high costs of 
directly relocating a brand may be an important motivation for  mergers 
between CPA firms. 
If  costs of  relocation are substantial (therefore  locations more or less fixed), 
the characteristic vectors of  audit firms  will tend to be separated. For example, 
there will be an array of  credibility levels associated with firm  brands. Thus any 
grouping of  suppliers into broad classes such as Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight is 
necessarily arbitrary and should be tested for  within-group homogeneity. Note, 
however, that audit firm  product vectors will  tend to be clustered in response 
to concentrations of  client demand. 
2.5 Welfare  Implications  of  Product  Differentiation 
When dealing with differentiated  products, a social welfare  question which 
can be asked is this: given a location equilibrium, will the variety of  characteris-
tic vectors offered  for  sale in the market be optimal?15 This evaluation involves 
a trade-off.  On the one hand, the greater the variety of  characteristic vectors, 
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the better the market caters to diverse consumer tastes and preferences.  On 
the other hand, the assumption of  differentiated  products (imperfect  sub-
stitutes) implies that the demand curves faced  by suppliers are downward 
sloping and equilibrium must occur where average production costs are still 
falling.  Thus differentiated  products imply a loss of  efficiency.  Unfortunately, 
the welfare  properties of  the free  market solution depend on the specific  values 
of  parameters. That is, in general too many or too few  product varieties may be 
produced and sold [Friedman, 1983]. Hence beyond these general statements 
the economic literature offers  no conclusion about the welfare  implications of 
product differentiation  in auditing from  the usual perspective. 
However, a somewhat different  question appears to be more relevant here; 
namely, is it socially desirable for  auditors to offer  differentiated  services at all 
to their clients? Since the demand for  auditing is not a consumption demand but 
rather is derived from  top management's objective function  which is assumed 
to be maximization of  own wealth or utility, are demand differences,  in some 
sense, socially legitimate? There is no special problem if  top management's 
objective is consistent with the objectives of  shareholders and creditors. Such 
mutuality of  interests would occur with respect to the characteristics control 
and product  line scope. That is, all three parties are presumably interested in 
efficient  monitoring of  organization subordinates and efficient  acquisition and 
utilization of  consulting services. However, the credibility characteristic is 
clearly different  in that the purpose of  auditor credibility is to ameliorate an 
agency problem between top management and the other two groups. Thus, the 
legitimacy of  product differentiation  on this dimension is likely to be a 
controversial, but interesting question. To answer the question, we must 
analyze the nature, role, and demand for  credibility in more detail. 
III. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Choice 
3.1 Nature  of  Audit  Service  Credibility 
Dopuch and Simunic [1982] describe auditor credibility as follows  (p. 407): 
An auditor's attestation to the authenticity of  financial  statements adds 
credibility to these top management assertions. Credibility is judged by 
users. More credible reporting simply means a report is more likely to 
be truthful  or lack intentional misrepresentation. . . . Shareholders will 
rationally expect that attestation by a credible auditor reduces the 
probability that management is able to successfully  conceal 'self-serving 
behavior.' 
This is consistent with both Watts and Zimmerman [1980] and De Angelo 
[1981(b)] who argue that the ex ante value of  an audit to shareholders and 
creditors depends on these individuals' (or "the market's") perception of  the 
joint probability that a given auditor will discover errors and irregularities in a 
set of  financial  statements and report those findings  truthfully  (without 
omission or bias).16 Recall that this is also De Angelo's definition  of  audit 
quality. 
The concept can be made more precise by considering a simplified  Bayesian 
model of  an auditor's decision problem. Assume an auditor faces  a two-action, 
two-state reporting decision where the states of  nature are: (s1) — the financial 
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statements are correct, and (s2) — the financial  statements are materially 
incorrect. The available actions are: (a1) — give an unqualified  opinion, or (a2) 
— give an appropriately qualified  or adverse opinion. Assume the auditor has 
performed  all the usual audit tests at a certain intensity level, measured by n, 
which yield possible signals, t. Further, the test results, t, indicate the 
presence of  only immaterial errors. Then the posterior probability of  s 2 will be: 
p"(s2|t,n) = 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) + 1(t|n,s1)(1 -p'(s2)) 
where 
p" = a posterior distribution on the states 
p' = a prior distribution on the states 
1 = a likelihood function 
This expression can be simplified  if  it is assumed that the auditor cannot commit 
a Type I error. That is, if  the auditor receives a signal, t, which indicates 
material errors are present, he will keep sampling. If  the state of  nature is s1, 
additional evidence should lead to the discovery that sampling error is 
responsible for  the faulty  signal. Thus, 1(t|n,s1) = 1 and17 
p"(s2|t,n) = 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) + (1-p '(s2)) 
Assume that, given p"(s2), the auditor will take action a1. 
A measure of  the credibility of  the financial  statements  (the "package") 
reflecting  all available information  about management, the auditor, and organi-
zational and environmental factors  would be 1-p"(s2). On the other hand, a 
measure of  the credibility of  the auditor,  or audit service, is 1 - 1(t|n,S2), which 
is the power of  the auditor's tests (the complement of  the probability of  a Type 
II error). 
3.2 Demand for  Credibility 
It is generally agreed that a major purpose of  financial  statements is to 
provide information  which is useful  in assessing a company's future  cash flows 
[e.g., Beaver, 1981]. It is also reasonable to assume that when top manage-
ment has agency relationships with creditors and shareholders, errors in 
financial  statements (both historical statements and those to be delivered in the 
future)  will not be merely random or capricious. Rather, such errors will tend to 
reflect  top management's own expected utility maximizing motives, which will 
typically be to induce financial  statement users to overestimate  these flows. 18 
The probability that such errors are detected ex ante (before  users assess the 
firm's  cash flows)  increases with the credibility of  the audit. 
The cash flows  of  the firm  are important because the wealth of  users will be 
a function  of  such flows  and any errors in their assessment. For example, 
unrecorded liabilities may cause a banker to assess a downward biased 
probability of  the borrower's bankruptcy and hence, charge too low an interest 
rate. Or, overstated historical revenues may cause a purchaser of  common 
stock to pay an inflated  price relative to the true value of  shares. Of  course, if 
the error is subsequently discovered, an injured user will seek to recover his 
losses from  any person who, through negligence or fraud,  created the error or 
failed  to detect and report it. But such ex post compensation is not likely to be 
complete. As a result, users will value a credible audit ex ante and, ignoring the 
costs of  auditing, prefer  more credibility to less. 
In order to transform  the ex ante value of  credibility to users into an 
effective  demand for  credibility by top management, it is necessary to identify  a 
mechanism through which costs to users from  possible financial  statement 
errors are imposed (at least partially) ex ante on top management. A reasonable 
assumption is that users of  financial  statements are rational and "price protect'' 
themselves in transactions with management. That is, they anticipate the costs 
that top management, acting in its own self-interest,  can impose upon them, 
and adjust the terms of  contracts accordingly. An extreme form  of  "price 
protection" is refusal  to transact. For example, a bank may demand a high rate 
of  interest on a commercial loan where the application is supported by 
unaudited financial  statements, or may simply refuse  to make such a loan. Or a 
prospective shareholder will submit a low bid for  stock if  the company's 
financial  statements have not been verified  by a credible auditor, or may refuse 
to buy such shares. Thus, under the rational user assumption, top managers 
will demand credible auditing in their own interests. 
The auditor's decision problem from  the previous section can be extended 
to provide insights into the demand for  credibility. Assume a particular user 
assesses the present value of  a company's future  cash flows,  given all the 
available information,  including a set(s) of  unaudited  financial  statements, as the 
value, ø.19 However, if  these statements contain a material error(s), actual cash 
flows  will yield a lower present value of  ø-w. The user's wealth is some 
increasing function,  g, of  the firm's  cash flows.  Thus, the user's expected 
wealth is 
[1-P'(s2)]g(ø) + p'(s2)g(ø-w) {3.1} 
where p' is his assessed prior distribution on the states. 
Note that a credible but costless audit can benefit  the user in two ways: 
1) The audit can induce a Bayesian revision of  p' to a posterior distribution, 
p". If  p"(s2) < p'(s2), the user's expected wealth is increased. 
2) If  the user is risk averse, the auditor may function  as an insurer against 
the risk of  loss of  w, thus increasing the user's expected utility. 
However, after  assuming the risk, the auditor will himself  be motivated 
to minimize the insurance premium by performing  an audit examination. 
This will lead to a Bayesian revision of  the auditor's  prior, p', to a 
posterior distribution, p". 
In both cases, if  audit credibility were costless, a perfect  audit, which reduced 
p"(s2) to zero, would be demanded.20 
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3.3 Determinants  of  the Level of  Credibility  Demanded 
However, credibility is not a free  good and its cost is normally borne by the 
audited company. Given the other audit service attributes, the auditor's fee  for 
credibility is X2c2q and for  a specific  company (fixed  q), an increase in c2 
requires an increase in audit intensity, n. Thus, choice of  credibility can be 
conceptually reduced to choice of  n. 
The ideal way to proceed at this point would be to specify  a model of  the 
determination of  audit intensity in a multiple person setting, obtain an optimum 
solution, and perform  comparative static analysis to identify  demand determin-
ants. However, this approach is not possible as no such model exists. 
A more restrictive but useful  approach is to consider the choice of  n by a 
representative risk neutral user in a single-person decision setting. That is, the 
user either performs  the audit himself  or delegates its performance  to an 
auditor whose interests are perfectly  aligned with his own. Assume there is an 
audit technology and an associated cost function,  γ(n). Given p', g(w), and a 
loss from  Type I error,21 all assessed by the user, an optimum audit intensity, 
n*, can be calculated by performing  a Bayesian preposterior analysis. It is well 
known (e.g., see Kinney, 1975) that, in this setting, n* is an increasing function 
of  two key parameters of  the problem, the loss from  Type II error, g(w), and 
the value of  p'(s2). Assume the "auditor" performs  this optimum examination, 
receives the signal t, which indicates no material errors exist, and issues an 
unqualified  opinion. Then the representative user's expected wealth after  the 
audit is 
[1-p"(s2|t,n*)]g(ø-γ(n*)) + p"(s2|t,n*)g[ø- w-γ(n*)] {3.2} 
where γ(n*) is also the auditor's fee,  λ2c2q. The net gain from  auditing, and 
receiving an unqualified  opinion, to the risk neutral user is {3.2} minus {3.1}. 
This must be positive, since n* was computed optimally by equalizing the 
marginal value of  information  to marginal audit cost. 
This analysis suggests that users' demand for  credibility will depend on two 
factors: 
1) the larger the loss from  material financial  statement error, the higher the 
level of  audit service credibility demanded, and 
2) the higher the prior probability users assess that the financial  statements 
will be materially in error, the higher the level of  credibility demanded. 
If  users can price protect themselves in transactions with management, these 
factors  can also be expected to drive top management's demand for  audit 
credibility. 
Before  proceeding further,  it is useful  to consider the exact sources of  the 
benefits  from  credibility implicit in our analysis of  the problem. Expression 
{3.1} states that user wealth is lower in state s2 than in s1. It is the avoidance of 
this loss which drives the demand for  credibility. In some cases, by detecting 
material errors when they exist, an audit can simply shift  a cost from  users to 
top management. However, in the majority of  cases, when no material errors 
are detected (or detected errors are corrected), an audit can overcome an 
information  asymmetry between management and users about the presence of 
material errors in the. financial  statements. This is valuable to managers whose 
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statements (unknown to users) are, in fact,  "fairly  presented." Finally, the 
knowledge that an audit will be performed  can have a direct productive  effect, 
resolving a "moral hazard" problem [e.g., Baiman, 1982] thus reducing 
agency costs in the relationship between top management and users. This will 
occur if  managers anticipate that a credible audit will reduce their ability to 
conceal actions (e.g., shirking) that are not in the best interests of  users. 
In addition to these effects  an audit may also have some insurance value to 
risk averse users. But such a role is dubious, since auditors are not strictly 
liable for  losses to users; even under the most severe liability statutes, an 
auditor can invoke a "due diligence" defense.  However, recent court decisions 
[e.g., Collins, 1985] suggest that this insurance role of  auditors may be 
increasing in importance. 
3.4 Effect  of  Information  Asymmetry About Audit  Service 
Production 
If  one assumes that users can observe the production function  of  the 
auditor, hence the power of  the auditor's tests and the level of  credibility 
delivered, any auditor could supply any level of  credibility demanded by top 
management.22 But this is clearly not the case. The auditor has complete 
information  about his production process, and top management may be able to 
observe audit production imperfectly.  However, users are precluded from 
directly observing the performance  of  the audit. As stated in the last section, 
this information  asymmetry will cause users to rely upon the auditor's brand 
name or reputation as a surrogate measure of  audit service credibility. We now 
develop this argument. 
A possible method which could be suggested to overcome the information 
asymmetry would be simple disclosure of  the details of  the auditor's examina-
tion. In fact,  one could even argue that the current stylized claim to audit 
performance  "in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards" is 
sufficient,  since the reader is informed  that the auditor "did what he should 
have done" in the circumstances. However, the auditor is an economic agent 
who can be expected to pursue his own self-interest,  and such disclosures and 
claims are in themselves meaningless. This is so because the information 
asymmetry is associated with a moral hazard problem between the auditor and 
users. In the absence of  observation, the user has no reason to believe that the 
auditor has performed  the examination he claims to have performed. 
Note that users (as principals) can attempt to resolve this moral hazard 
problem by contracting with the auditor on mutually observable information  of 
some sort. This approach is taken in two agent analyses of  the auditing 
problem, such as in Antle [1982]. However, these models are of  little empirical 
relevance because, in the real world, such contracting simply does not occur. 
Moreover, even the terms of  any contract between the top management and 
the auditor are not observable to users. 
Hence, because an auditor cannot directly communicate, in a meaningful 
way, variations in the power of  his tests and users value different  levels of 
credibility in different  circumstances, auditors  must specialize in the delivery of 
credibility levels. That is, while an auditor's credibility may change over time, it 
must be fixed  at a moment in time across engagements. Returning to the 
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fertilizer  example, an auditor cannot combine different  proportions of  nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and potash as required by users and sell these different  products 
in uniform,  unlabeled bags! 
As a result, each auditor's brand name or reputation will imply delivery of  a 
certain level of  credibility and, at any moment, there is a fixed  rank ordering of 
auditors based on perceived credibility. Top management's choice among 
different  credibility levels thus requires a choice among auditors. 
3.5 Reputation  Investments,  Audit  Failure,  and Auditor 
Liability 
An auditor can acquire a reputation to perform  audits of  a certain level of 
credibility through various means. For example, it is likely that he must invest 
in technology, physical facilities,  personnel and their knowledge, organization 
control systems, etc. to efficiently  produce a credibility level. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to assume that efficient  production of  more powerful  audit tests 
requires a higher level of  such investments. Thus users could infer  the 
auditor's credibility level by observing these investments directly, through 
advertising, or through informal  communication of  various sorts. Note that 
auditor specialization imposes a far  lower information  burden upon users than 
would a need to infer  varying credibility for  each auditor  for  each audit!  Note 
also that the higher the level of  fixed  investments which are specialized to 
production of  a certain credibility level, the higher the relocation costs and the 
more stable the auditor's brand name over time. 
A potentially useful  source of  information  about brand name is the rate of 
audit failure  for  which an auditor is held to be liable. However, the connection is 
not a direct or simple one. Consider the following  descriptions of  four  possible 
engagements: 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
P'(s2) .2 .5 .5 .5 
g(w) $1 $1 $2 $2 
n n1 n2 n3 n1 
(n2>n1) (n3>n2>n1) 
1-β .90 .95 .99 .90 
Auditor X Y Z Z 
P"(s2) .02 .05 .01 .09 
In Case #1, the user's assessment of  the prior probability of  material error and 
the loss from  such an error leads to a demand for  audit credibility of  1 — β 
(where β is the conditional probability of  a Type II error) of  .90. The user 
believes this power of  a test will be delivered by auditor X and, after  observing 
an unqualified  opinion signed by auditor X, will assess a posterior probability of 
undetected material error, of  .02. Note that 1 -p"(s2) or .98 is the user 
assessed credibility of  the financial  statement package. In Case #2, since the 
user assesses a higher prior probability of  material error, he demands a higher 
power test which, he believes, is supplied by auditor Y. Case #3, with a higher 
assessed error cost, motivates a demand for  a still higher level of  credibility, 
which the user believes is supplied by auditor Z. 
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An audit failure  occurs when there is actual ex post discovery of  a material 
error in a set of  audited financial  statements. Note that, when auditing is costly, 
a rational user anticipates this possibility whenever p"(s2)>0. However, if  an 
error is actually discovered, a user who relied on the auditor's brand name is 
motivated to seek recovery of  losses suffered  on account of  the error and may 
file  suit against the auditor (and top management). The auditor, on the other 
hand, will raise a due diligence defense  and maintain that he was not negligent 
in the performance  of  the audit.23 If  the auditor complied with generally 
accepted auditing standards and obtained evidence deemed by the court to be 
sufficient  and appropriate in the circumstances, he will not be liable to the user. 
If  the user, the auditor, and the court all have homogeneous assessments of 
p'(s2) and g(w), then auditors X, Y and Z should not be liable in Cases #1 to 3. 
In each instance, the auditor promised to deliver a certain level of  credibility 
through his brand name and did so. However, in Case #4, auditor Z is expected 
to deliver a test whose power is .99 but fails  to perform  such a test. The user 
believes the posterior probability of  loss is .01, but faces  an actual probability of 
loss of  .09. If  an audit failure  occurs, a lawsuit is filed,  and the court agrees with 
the user's parameter assessments (i.e., that a .99 audit was appropriate in the 
circumstances), the auditor should be found  negligent and liable to the user for 
losses.24 
Given this process, what rates of  successful  litigation can users expect to 
observe with respect to auditors and what is the information  conveyed by these 
rates? Because of  the inherent uncertainties surrounding the audit and litigation 
process, the auditor's credibility level which is assessed as delivered ex post 
can be viewed as a drawing from  a probability distribution, whose mean is the 
current credibility level associated with a brand name. Under these circum-
stances, the normal rate of  successful  litigation  across all  credibility  levels  should 
be approximately  uniform.  Any auditor can be found  negligent in supplying a 
service, no matter what the exact specification  of  that service. Thus auditor 
"hit rates" provide no information  about the absolute or relative (across 
auditors) powers of  auditors' tests as such. However, if  an auditor experiences 
an unusually high "hit rate" during a period, this may be evidence that he is 
reducing his delivered credibility level to a lower value. That is, the rate 
provides information  about deterioration (intentional or unintentional) of  the 
auditor's reputation. Conversely, if  the auditor experiences an unusually low 
rate, this may be evidence that he has increased the power of  his tests beyond 
expected levels and is repositioning his brand name by investing in reputation. 
3.6 Implications  of  the Analysis  for  Auditor  Behavior 
An auditor's brand name or reputation is the basis on which users predict 
the level of  credibility he will deliver. A wealth maximizing auditor can be 
expected to position his brand in the market seeking to maximize his monopoly 
rents. That is, he will seek a niche where there is high demand and few 
competitors. In addition, if  there are sunk costs associated with a particular 
credibility level, his return on these immovable investments is a quasi-rent 
[Klein, Crawford  and Alchian, 1978]. To protect his rents an auditor is 
motivated to maintain intertemporal stability in his delivered credibility level. 
Other things being equal, the higher the rents, the greater the motivation to 
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maintain the level of  service [Klein and Leffler,  1981]. However, note that rents 
can exist at any credibility level in the market. 
It is useful  to contrast this result with De Angelo's claim, discussed in 
Section 1, that larger audit firms  will report more truthfully  than smaller firms 
for  fear  of  losing their larger aggregate quasi-rents. Note that De Angelo 
focuses  on the second aspect of  credibility, that an auditor will report  his findings 
honestly, rather than the probability of  discovery  of  errors in audit testing which 
is the focus  of  our analysis. This is an important difference  because an auditor 
who fails  to report a known material error commits a fraudulent  act, not mere 
negligence. Penalties for  fraud,  if  discovered, tend to be severe no matter what 
the circumstances. In particular, potential penalties an auditor faces  personally, 
such as a jail sentence and loss of  certification  and license to practice, probably 
override any concerns with rents. Thus, one can reasonably argue that the 
probability of  deliberate misrepresentation by auditors is constant, regardless 
of  the auditor's brand name. However, a reporting issue may well arise when 
the criteria determining what constitutes an error and/or materiality are 
ambiguous. These situations require the exercise of  professional  judgment and 
the ability to make decisions deemed to be "correct" ex post can vary among 
auditors. Such abilities can readily be encompassed in the concept of  power of 
test and hence auditor brand name. 
Returning to De Angelo, our analysis then differs  from  hers in two basic 
ways. First, her focus  on the probability of  misrepresentation as the element of 
credibility on which audit firms  differ  casts an unnecessarily pejorative tone on 
product differentiation.  Second, she makes an extreme assumption about 
relocation alternatives—namely, if  an auditor is caught cheating, he will lose his 
other clients. Thus her quasi-rents from  multi-period pricing motivate stability 
of  location, but the auditor's choice is simply the current location (which is a 
mechanistic function  of  audit firm  size) and being out of  the market! By 
contrast, in our analysis, the prospect of  earning monopoly rents motivates an 
auditor's brand name location while the desire to maintain monopoly rents and 
quasi-rents from  any immovable resources motivates an auditor to remain in 
that location over time. 
To summarize and illustrate these ideas, consider how auditors are 
expected to match-up with a set of  available clients. Assume three companies 
where users value low, medium, and high levels of  auditor credibility, 
respectively, and three auditors (X, Y and Z) exist. Assume the auditors agree 
with user assessment of  p'(s2) and g(w) and hence with the power of  tests 
appropriate in each situation. Also, the auditors have homogeneous production 
functions  and can produce the three levels of  auditing for  $100, $200, and $300, 
respectively. The possible auditor-company pairings are shown below: 
Credibility Demanded 
Auditor Low Medium High 
X $100 $200 $300 
Y $100 $200 $300 
Z $100 $200 $300 
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Assume audit services are differentiated  but an auditor can "tailor" an 
examination to the demands of  users through explicit contracting. Now if  the 
audits were put up for  bid, each auditor's bid would at least cover his costs for 
each client and, in a competitive setting, auditor choice would be indeterminate. 
Now assume auditors have brand names in the eyes of  users where X — 
low, Y — medium, Z — high. The bids on the main diagonal are clearly 
acceptable to users. However, the upper right hand off-diagonal  bids are not 
acceptable because the production process is not observable. Moreover, even 
if  auditors are liable for  negligence, these bids are still not acceptable so long as 
users value credibility ex ante because litigation is not a perfect  substitute for 
loss prevention (i.e., users do not expect full  loss recovery from  the auditor). 
The off-diagonal  bids at the lower left  are somewhat more problematic. 
Given the brand names, the bids are acceptable to users, who would appear to 
be receiving a free  good from  auditors Y and Z. Moreover, since auditors agree 
with users as to the power of  tests appropriate in the circumstances, there is 
no expected auditor liability problem! The difficulty  here arises from  the 
assumption that production functions  are homogeneous. If,  in fact,  there are 
fixed  costs of  producing a particular credibility level and higher credibility 
production is associated with higher fixed  costs, then these off-diagonal  bids 
would tend to be higher, for  a given company, than those on the main diagonal. 
Thus auditor choice would be determined consistent with the perceived brand 
name. 
Finally, note that in this example since there is only one auditor appropriate 
for  each company, auditors will earn monopoly rents. However, in general, 
there can be many auditors at a particular location in the limit driving monopoly 
rents to zero [see Rosen, 1974]. 
3.7  An Alternative  View:  Credibility  As a Posterior  Probability 
In previous subsections, auditor credibility has been identified  with the 
power of  the auditor's tests. An alternative possibility is to associate it with the 
posterior probability of  financial  statement error, or 1 -p"(s2). Note that this 
corresponds with what has previously been labeled the credibility of  the 
financial  statement package. This alternative view is attractive because it 
assumes that users care about the possibility of  financial  statement errors and 
their consequences, but not about the separate contributions of  the auditor and 
top management. Consistent with this assumption, auditors may be liable for  all 
undetected material financial  statement errors, but users still value credibility 
ex ante because expected loss recovery is not complete. In this setting, an 
auditor's brand name would imply a level of  1-p"(s2). That is, different 
auditors would be associated with a different  posterior probability that the 
financial  statements were erroneous. However, the Bayesian revision would be 
performed  only by the auditor; users would be concerned only with p"(s2). In 
effect,  the user delegates to the auditor the responsibility for  performing  tests 
consistent with various prior probabilities of  error. 
The demand for  different  levels of  1-p"(s2) can be derived from  the 
different  dollar (or utility) consequences users face  in different  circumstances. 
That is, the greater is g(w), the higher the level of  credibility demanded. Since 
auditor tests and p"(s2) are not observable directly, users must still rely upon 
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the auditor's brand name which must be assessed from  various sources of 
information,  including advertising, levels of  fixed  investment, etc. However, 
the rate of  successful  litigation against an auditor can now be associated more 
directly with a brand name. 
As before,  an auditor is motivated to deliver 1 -p"(s2) consistent with his 
brand name to preserve rents at that location. However, since auditors are 
liable for  all undetected errors, the "hit rate" observed will be a proxy for 
p"(s2). Note that each auditor expects to incur a particular "hit rate" and such 
rates are expected to vary. But since auditing is costly, so long as there are 
variations in dollar consequences, variations in auditor credibility and "hit 
rates" are desirable from  an economic point of  view. Again, being a low 
credibility auditor does not have pejorative implications! If  auditors in this 
situation were allowed to invoke a negligence defense,  then the above 
implications would still go through, so long as the success of  such defenses 
were randomly distributed across auditors and engagements. 
While this alternative view of  auditor credibility seems to capture certain 
aspects of  reality (e.g., the delegation for  responsibility to the auditor) better 
than when credibility is identified  with the power of  the auditor's tests, both 
scenarios have essentially the same implications for  auditor choice. 
3.8 Auditor  Choice  by Top  Management 
In the previous section we identified  three audit service characteristics, 
control (c1), credibility (c2), and product line (c3), which top management may 
value. Levels of  control and product line will be demanded through manage-
ment's desire to maximize corporate profits  or firm  value as a determinant of 
management's own compensation. Since there is no conflict  between users and 
management with respect to these two characteristics, the choice can be 
expected to be optimal from  both groups' point of  view. 
There is a conflict  between users and management with respect to auditor 
credibility, and management can be expected to make an optimal choice, given 
its own interests. However, if  users are rational and price protect themselves 
when transacting with management, this choice can be expected to at least 
directionally reflect  users' demand determinants. 
Formally, top management's problems of  choosing an optimum set of  audit 
service characteristics for  a period can be described as follows: 
where Ө is some benefit  function  to top management and F is the audit fee 
function.  Note that the audit service determines an expected present value of 
net cash flows  to the firm  as perceived by financial  statement users. If  users 
are "price protected'' then top management expects to gain from  the purchase 
of  credibility. Also, a constraint is included to recognize that control and 
credibility are likely to be joint products in production and hence not 




Ө[ø(c1,c2,c3) - wp"(s2|c2) - F(c1,c2,c3)] 
{3.3} 
c1 - k(c2) = 0 
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Management's solution to this problem determines an optimum character-
istics vector, (c1*, c2*, c3*). However, there is no guarantee that this vector of 
characteristics will be available in the market since, we have argued, production 
of  all three characteristics likely involves fixed  costs. Thus, the final  step will 
be a choice of  the specific  auditor who minimizes opportunity cost (i.e., the 
"transportation cost") associated with the suboptimal choice. 
3.9 Illustrative  Example 
To illustrate some of  the ideas concerning auditor choice developed in this 
section, consider the simple case of  a company with no debt solely owned by a 
100 percent owner and manager who wishes to sell 50 percent of  his common 
shares to an outsider or "user" who will assume an active role in future 
management. (That is, no external agency relationship is created. The situation 
when a new agency relationship arises is examined subsequently.) Assume the 
company has been in business for  one year and the owner has prepared a set of 
unaudited financial  statements which show a net operating cash flow  of  $10,000 
for  the year. The user is risk neutral and has an opportunity rate of  return on 
investment of  10 percent. Assume that the user believes the company's cash 
flows  will follow  a random walk in perpetuity. Thus, the best point estimate of 
future  cash flows  is simply the level earned last year. 
If  the user knows the financial  statements to be accurate, the assessed 
value of  the firm  will be $100,000 and the user should be willing to pay up to 
$50,000 for  a 50 percent interest. However, this is not likely to be the case. 
Rather, the user will recognize that the owner-manager has an incentive to 
overstate the reported cash flows  of  the firm,  but not all owner-managers will 
necessarily do so. If  the financial  statements are in fact  erroneous (assume the 
true cash flows  were only $8,000 last year), the true value of  the firm  is 
$80,000. 
Suppose the user assesses a prior probability of  .3 that the financial 
statements are in error. Since the user can price protect himself  through his 
offering  price for  the shares, it would appear that he would be willing to pay no 
more than 50 percent of  the expected value, or $47,000. Since the manager 
who prepared the financial  statements knows their true state, he knows that 
this price is too high. Thus, he would gladly accept the offer  of  $47,000 if  the 
statements were erroneous, but would reject it if  the statements were correct 
and auditor credibility was available to convince the user of  their truthfulness. 
Assume, for  the moment, that the statements do not contain material 
errors. Suppose an optimum audit, which maximizes {3.3}, costs $3,000 and 
induces a Bayesian revision of  probabilities by the user from  p'(s2) = .3 to 
p"(s2) = .1. Such an optimum audit implies an optimum level of  credibility, or 
c2*, purchased by the manager or (suppressing c1 and c3) 
max .5[$100,000 - $20,000 p"(Si|c2) - F(c2)] = 
.5[$100,000 - $20,000 (.1) - $3,000] = $95,000. 
Note that Ө = .5 in this case is the fraction  of  equity being sold to the user. 
Thus, if  the financial  statements are correct and the auditor cannot commit a 
type I error, he will issue an unqualified  opinion. Having seen this opinion and 
the identity of  the auditor, the user is willing to pay up to $47,500 for  the 
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shares. Since the user is price protected both with or without the audit, it is the 
manager who gains from  the purchase of  credibility. 
Returning to the question of  the appropriate offering  price if  there is no 
audit, consider the transaction in a market context. Suppose, for  example, that 
ten investment opportunities of  identical characteristics are available to the 
user. Furthermore, his prior probability of  error is correct in the sense that 
three managers have overstated their reported cash flows  while seven have not 
done so. If  the user, without seeing an audit, offers  to purchase a 50 percent 
interest in some firm  at $47,000, he can be certain that only a manager who 
misrepresented his cash flows  will accept! Thus, he would not, in fact,  offer 
$47,000, but only $40,000. At this price he will be fully  protected against loss 
and managers whose financial  statements are correct will be motivated to 
purchase auditor credibility, as described above. Thus, in a market context, 
where there are many similar potential users, there will be a distribution of 
auditor - client pairings, with perhaps some managers, who misrepresented 
their cash flows,  purchasing no auditor credibility. 
This example illustrates only one possible situation in which auditor 
credibility is valued by managers. The case is referred  to in the literature as an 
"adverse selection problem" [e.g., Baiman, 1982] and credibility here serves 
as a signal of  a manager's honesty, which itself  is exogeneously given. 
However, since the user is fully  price protected against manager misrepresen-
tation, auditor credibility may also change the reporting behavior of  a manager. 
For example, since the manager whose statements are unfair  has fooled  no one 
in this illustration, he may be motivated to correct existing errors and submit to 
a credible audit to increase the selling price of  the shares. 
Now consider the same situation, except that the user does not intend to 
assume an active role in the management of  the firm,  but will retain the former 
owner as the manager. Thus an agency relationship, and an attendant moral 
hazard problem arises. To forecast  future  cash flows  as simply a continuation of 
the historical flow  (either $10,000 or $8,000) would be naive, since the future 
agency costs which can be expected to result from  the manager's reduced 
ownership interest in the firm  are being ignored. Given the manager's known 
future  trade-off  between firm  value and perquisite consumption, assume the 
user forecasts  maximum agency costs to be $1,000 per year. 
In the absence of  the agency relationship, the user would have assessed a 
prior probability of  error of  p'(s2) = .3. However, knowing that the agency 
relationship will be created, we argue that the user is likely to assess a higher 
prior probability that the financial  statements are erroneous. This is so because 
it is in the manager's interest to try to induce the user to bear some or all of  the 
future  agency costs through an initial overvaluation of  the firm.  Moreover, the 
larger  the expected future  agency costs, the larger  the difference  between the 
true and reported cash flows  is likely to be. Returning to the example, if  the 
manager still reports $10,000 and the user believes cash flows  could have been 
$8,000 with a probability of  p'(s2)= .4, he will offer  ½ [($8,000 - $1,000) ÷ 
.1] = $35,000. Again, managers who have not misrepresented their cash flows 
are motivated to hire auditors of  appropriate (and relative to the previous case, 
higher) credibility. Conversely, given the user's complete price protection, 
managers who have initially misrepresented their cash flows  may be motivated 
to change their reporting and purchase a credible audit. 
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Finally, in this case, if the user views a credible audit now as a commitment 
that such audits will continue to be obtained in the future, he may reduce the 
amount of his forecasted future agency costs below $1,000. This is so because 
a credible audit prevents (imperfectly) managers from concealing the effects of 
such behavior (e.g., shirking, consuming excess perquisites, etc.) by overstat-
ing the cash flows reported in future financial statements. Depending upon the 
manager's utility trade-off between firm value now and the present value of 
future perquisite consumption, it may be optimal for the manager to commit to 
such future audits, thereby increasing the elling price of the shares. 
IV. Concluding Comments 
In this paper, we have analyzed the nature of differentiated audit services 
and the determinants of auditor choice. The perspective on the audit services 
market developed here differs ignificantly from the typical textbook view of 
auditing where any auditor can do anything, and also, we believe, from th  
conventional thinking of auditing practitioners and academics. Two  conclusions 
in particular should be emphasized: First, we have argued that differentiation on 
an auditor credibility dimension arises from differences in demand which are 
themselves a function of differences in company characteristics. Thus, a 
ranking of audit firms on acredibility dimension has no pejorative implications. 
Second, given such differences in demand and auditor location, we expect to 
observe a relatively stable distribution f auditor-client pairs which reflects the 
optimum decisions of top management under existing circumstances. As we 
have seen, both the relationship between top management, the auditor, and 
financial statement users, and the characteristics of the audit service are quite 
complex. Our objective has been to develop a logicalstructure for this complex 
reality as a basis for understanding different auditor choices by top manage-
ments of different companies. 
End  Notes 
1. Note that in his study of Australian audit fees, Francis [1984] found no evidence of low-
balling. Also, while De Angelo demonstrates that "low balling" in first period bids is an equilibrium 
strategy in a world of certainty, it is not obvious that this bidding strategy is necessarily an 
equilibrium under uncertainty. However, even if low-balling does occur, the "strength" of the 
collateral bond will decrease over time as the initial fee discount is recovered through quasi-rents. 
Since auditor-client pairings tend to be long-lived (about 20 years on average), the motivational 
impact of the residual collateral bonds that will exist at any moment  in time is not obvious. 
2. Let qi denote the quantity of product of the it h firm and pj denote the price of the product of 
the jt h firm, then the cross elasticity coefficient is 
n ij = (∂qi/qi)/(∂pj/pj) 
where qi = fi(p) is the d mand  function faced by firm i and p1 = (p1.. .pm) is the vector of prices for 
the products of the m firms in the industry. 
3. However, as noted earlier, there is a further complicating factor in such studies in that an 
audit fee is not a  simple price,  but rather the product of price times quantity of service purchased. 
4. The standard assumption is that managers' utility functions include both wealth and effort as 
arguments. Managers  are assumed to derive utility from wealth and disutility from effort. 
However, auditors and their services do not  enter directly into the utility function. 
5. The agency relationship has a long history as a form of social interaction. Ross [1973] 
characterizes the agency relationship as arising "between two (or more) parties when one, 
designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the 
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principal, in a particular domain of  decision problems." Because the agent is himself  an expected 
utility maximizing individual, it is unrealistic to assume that he will always necessarily act so as to 
maximize the expected utility of  the principal. However, the principal can limit the divergence of 
interests by establishing incentives for  the agent and by incurring monitoring costs. Likewise the 
agent may incur bonding costs to guarantee to the principal that he will not take certain actions. But 
these mechanisms are unlikely to perfectly  align the divergent interests of  the principal and 
agent(s)—it is, in fact,  unlikely to be optimal to try to do so—with the result that there will still be 
some residual loss. Note, however, that the expanded opportunity set which the agency 
relationship allows must yield a net benefit  to the principal (and perhaps the agent), else the 
relationship would simply not arise [see Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. 
6. In addition to this potential "asset substitution" problem, Smith and Warner [1979] list 
three other sources of  conflict  between an owner-manager and debtholders: 
1) dividend payment—increasing dividend payout after  the debt issuance (in the extreme, 
paying a liquidating dividend to shareholders, leaving the debtholders with a worthless claim). 
2) claim dilution—unexpectedly issuing additional debt of  equal or higher priority after  the 
current debt issuance. 
3) underinvestment—refusing  to invest in positive net present value projects whose 
primary benefit  accrues to the bondholders. 
7. While only 15 percent of  the companies voluntarily purchased a full  audit, another 69 percent 
purchased either a review or compilation service, which are lower cost partial substitutes for  the 
audit service. Moreover, as with the audit, the primary and secondary reasons given (with 
essentially the same frequencies)  for  the purchase of  these audit substitutes were "control'' and 
"credibility." 
8. In this data set, consulting services were defined  to include any non-audit service except 
corporate tax work (i.e., return preparation, planning, etc.). 
9. Throughout this monograph, the term "client'' refers  to the top management of  a company. 
10. A complete discussion of  the exact nature of  audit credibility is deferred  until Section 3. 
11. More precisely, it is the purchase of  the best form  of  audit opinion (i.e., unqualified, 
qualified,  or adverse) which management can expect given the characteristics of  the financial 
statements being audited. 
12. A related question is—how does the model compare to the way audit fees  are ostensibly 
determined in practice? Audit services not performed  under a fixed  fee  arrangement are normally 
billed using a set of  hourly rates for  the various grades of  professional  labor utilized. Even with a 
fixed  fee,  the amount bid can be conceived as a function  of  expected labor usage and the billing rate 
structure. But this process only defines  a "standard fee"  or upper bound on the amount collected. 
The standard fee  may be discounted for  a variety of  reasons including perceived inefficiencies  in 
labor usage, because the job utilizes resources which would otherwise be idle or underemployed, 
or under the pressure of  competition. In addition, of  course, the process through which standard 
billing rates are set is not known, hence the (billing rate x time) model is not a particularly useful 
way to view the process of  audit fee  determination. 
13. Product scope would be measured by the expertise of  the firm  in supplying various types of 
consulting services. At a moment in time, the total level of  such firm  expertise is fixed.  Note that it 
is the fixed  costs associated with maintaining an expertise level for  sale as needed which will cause 
the implicit price of  scope (λ3) to be positive. However, only certain subsets of  the total service 
package may be relevant and therefore  priced to certain subsets of  clients. For example, the ability 
to design and install computerized hospital accounting systems will be relevant to some clients but 
irrelevant to others. Hence, an audit firm  may simultaneously offer  different  levels of  c 3 to different 
types of  companies. 
14. The offering  of  "near audit services," such as reviews and compilations, by public 
accounting firms  represents an attempt to reduce client opportunity losses in this situation. 
15. The criterion of  optimality normally used is whether the sum of  consumer's surplus plus 
producers' excess profits  is maximized [Schmalensee, 1978]. In an auditing context, consumer 
surplus can be interpreted in the normal way except that the demand curve is derived from  top 
management's objective function. 
16. Auditors frequently  distinguish between "errors," which are mechanistically caused by 
deficiencies  in financial  reporting systems, and "irregularities," which are the result of  intentional 
attempts to bias, conceal, or otherwise misrepresent financial  information.  We make no distinction 
between these situations. However, it has been suggested that optimum audit program design, 
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given the possible presence of  "irregularities," must recognize the gaming nature of  the situation 
[Fellingham and Newman, 1985]. 
17. This is essentially the audit risk model proposed by the Canadian Institute of  Chartered 
Accountants [CICA, 1980]. 
18. Auditors have long recognized that the greatest risk with respect to the financial 
statements of  publicly held companies (and companies with significant  debt) is that assets, and 
hence net income, are overstated. The reasonableness of  this concern was confirmed  by St. Pierre 
and Anderson's [1984] study of  129 lawsuits filed  against auditors in the U.S. during the 1960's and 
1970's. Of  the 334 alleged errors in these suits "none. . .concerned errors in undervaluing  assets, 
recognizing inadequate  amounts of  revenue, or recognizing excessive expenses" (p. 242). 
19. To focus  on the essential auditing aspects of  the problem, assume a world of  certainty, 
except for  the state of  the financial  statements. 
20. This statement assumes that the audit evidence indicates that no material errors exist. 
Presumably, if  top management knew that a perfect  audit would be performed,  they would not 
attempt to deceive users. However, if  this were not the case, the perfect  audit still would resolve 
all uncertainty. Knowing that p"(s2) = 1, users could behave accordingly. 
21. If  the user falsely  rejects the null hypothesis that the financial  statements do not contain 
material errors, he may choose not to transact with top management or may request contract 
terms which will not be acceptable to management. In either case, the user loses whatever net 
benefits  were available to him in the "trade." 
22. Assuming the auditor was technically capable of  performing  an audit of  the company—given 
its size, complexity, geographic dispersion of  operations, etc.; that is, he can deliver the required q, 
efficiently.  Also, efficient  production of  higher levels of  credibility may require higher fixed  costs. 
This is discussed in Section 3.5. 
23. This is, in fact,  his "worst case" defense  under statutes such as the Securities Act of 
1933. Under the Securities Exchange Act of  1934, and probably under common law appealing to 
the Ultramares decision, the auditor can claim a mere absence of  gross negligence or fraud  as his 
defense. 
24. For what amount of  damages should the auditor be liable? In principal, since the auditor 
increased the user expected loss by $.16 through his negligence, this should be the amount of 
damages assessed each time the auditor  is negligent.  However, not all instances of  negligence are 
likely to be discovered ex post. While negligence by the auditor increases the probability  of 
undetected material error (e.g., from  .01 to .09 in case #4), negligence need not result in an actual 
audit failure.  For example, assume auditor Z performs  100 audits in a given year (such as case #4) 
where users expect .99 credibility but only .90 is delivered. Users expect three audit failures  and 
losses of  $6. However, suppose nine audit failures  occur causing losses of  $18. Users will 
presumably seek damages of  $18 but only $12 should be awarded, else the auditor is being 
implicitly held to a perfect  audit standard. Conversely, if  users are only awarded the increase in 
expected loss in each case filed  or $.16 x 9 = $1.44, they are grossly undercompensated. How 
much would actually be awarded is, of  course, an open question but there is no apparent mechanism 
which would motivate a court to award the correct amount of  $12. 
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